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AUDITOR BIDDING AND INDEPENDENCE:
A LABORATORY MARKETS INVESTIGATION
Abstract
Certain economic factors in the auditing environment have been
hypothesized to affect both prices selected by auditors and their
independence. This paper reports the use of laboratory markets to test the
hypotheses that start-up costs and the client's cost of changing auditors
results in lowballing in initial engagements and in decreased independence.
The results of the experiments support theoretical predictions to a limited
extent: initial period lowballing is observed but not always at the predicted
level and increased availability of quasi -rents leads to subject behavior
consistent with decreased independence.

AUDITOR BIDDING AND INDEPENDENCE:
A LABORATORY MARKETS INVESTIGATION
1. Introduction
There have been numerous reports in the popular press that competition in
the audit market has led to the practice of setting initial period audit fees
below the total cost of performing the audit (termed lowballing) [Andreder,
1979; Bernstein, 1978; Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities, 1978; Wall
Street Journal, 1985a, 1985b]. At the same time, policymakers have expressed
concern that competition and lowballing could lead to reduced auditor
independence and audit quality [Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities,
1978; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1977; United States Senate, 1977,
1985] .
Motivated by the concerns of policymakers, DeAngelo [1980, 1981] develops
a model of the auditor-client relationship that links aspects of the auditing
environment to lowballing and auditor independence. Under the assumptions
presented in Table 1, DeAngelo' s analysis predicts that transactions costs
provide incumbent auditors with client-specific quasi-rents over the life of
the auditor-client relationship. DeAngelo contends that lowballing for
initial engagements is an economically rational response to the availability
of the quasi-rents in a competitive market. DeAngelo further argues that
lowballing does not directly affect auditor independence because initial
period losses represent a sunk cost to the auditor. Rather, auditor
independence is predicted to be reduced by the availability of future quasi-
rents
.
Insert Table 1 About Here
While DeAngelo's model has been criticized (e.g., Simunic [1986]), it
should not be discarded until sufficient evidence is gathered to determine its
usefulness and another model, more tenable in the light of existing evidence,
is developed to replace it. Likewise, additional empirical evidence will aid
in the development of a better model. In any case, empirical evidence is
needed.
To address this need, several studies have examined the predictions of
DeAngelo's model. Researchers have used actual audit fee data to search for
evidence of lowballing [e.g., Baber, Brooks and Ricks, 1986; Beck and
Barefield, 1986; Francis, 1984; and Palmrose , 1986]. No clear evidence has
been gathered to date, principally because of the unavailability of data
regarding auditor production functions (however, Schatzberg [1987] describes a
study performed contemporaneously with the study reported here and finds
lowballing in a laboratory market where subjects' price choices are
exogenously constrained by the experimenter). Likewise, attempts to use field
data to infer auditor independence (e.g., Raganuthan, Lewis and Evans [1986])
have been limited by the inability to directly examine auditor behavior.
An alternative approach to most of the above studies is to gather
evidence supporting DeAngelo's model through the use of laboratory markets.
Laboratory markets allow direct observation of individual and market behavior
and control over all aspects of the environment. The approach thereby avoids
the measurement and estimation difficulties inherent in field studies (see
Smith, Schatzberg and Waller [1987] for additional discussion of the benefits
of laboratory markets in auditing research)
.
While a laboratory market study cannot provide evidence regarding the
reasonableness of the model as an abstraction of the audit market, it can be
used as a direct test of the veracity of the model in the abstract. To the
extent that the model is supported by direct tests, then belief in its ability
to predict human behavior is enhanced . Alternatively, if DeAngelo's
predictions are not borne out in a simple laboratory setting (designed to give
the model its best shot at success) , then it is unreasonable to expect
performance to improve in the complexity of the "real world." The similarity
(or mundane realism) of laboratory markets to the audit market is less
important in this regard. Rather, it is theory and not raw findings that are
generalized to the real world [Swieringa and Weick, 1982, p. 81].
Given the dearth of evidence and the importance of independence in
determining the demand for auditing in the marketplace [Watts and Zimmerman,
1983], the impact of market variables and auditor pricing behavior on
independence remains a significant issue to be addressed. Because DeAngelo's
model represents the seminal attempt to link independence with auditor pricing
behavior, it is the focus of the research question addressed in this paper.
Specifically, are the predictions of economic behavior generated by DeAngelo's
model borne out in a simple laboratory characterization of the audit market?
The remainder of this paper begins with a brief review of DeAngelo's
model, followed by a description of how the model is operationalized in a
laboratory setting. Next, testable hypotheses are developed. The
experimental method is then described and results from a series of experiments
are presented. Last, conclusions are presented and directions for future
research are discussed.
2. Model and Hypotheses
2.1 DeAngelo' s Model of the Auditor -Client Relationship
A principal result of DeAngelo' s analysis is the prediction that
lowballing will occur in initial offers made by auditors for an engagement as
a response to the availability of a future stream of quasi-rents accruing to
an incumbent. The quasi-rents arise from two sources. First, client-specific
start-up costs, K, incurred on the initial audit provide technological
advantages to an incumbent auditor on future audits of the client. Second, an
incumbent gains an advantage because the client faces transactions costs, CS
,
when changing auditors. When one or both of these aspects of the auditing
environment are in place, an incumbent can prevent entry by other auditors and
capture benefits by setting audit fees above the avoidable cost of producing
audits, A. These advantages represent a specialized asset in the hands of the
auditor
.
DeAngelo suggests that this specialized asset creates a bilateral
monopoly between the auditor and his client. A bilateral monopoly arises from
the ability of each party to impose real costs on the other by termination.
The auditor can force the client to incur transactions costs by terminating
the relationship. At the same time, by switching auditors the client could
impose a cost on the auditor through lost quasi-rents.
DeAngelo argues that the bilateral monopoly and the future quasi -rent
stream will be anticipated and reflected in equilibrium prices offered by
auditors in the initial engagement. That is, given that auditors bidding on
the initial engagement anticipate future quasi-rents upon gaining an
incumbency, competition in the market is hypothesized to drive first period
offers down to a point where the initial period audit fee, Flt will equal
first period costs, A + K, less the discounted value of future quasi-rents
accruing to the incumbent, or
F
x
= (A + K) - (F - A)/r (1)
where F is the future period audit fee charged by the incumbent and r is the
discount rate which is parametric and available to all auditors and clients in
the market. Thus, competition in the initial period is predicted by DeAngelo
to result in the use of a multiperiod pricing strategy by auditors, enabling
them to earn just a normal rate of return over the life of the relationship.
When the future rent stream, F - A, is positive , equation 1 predicts that the
initial period offer by an incumbent will be below initial period cost.
Since auditors are assumed to maximize utility, incumbents are predicted
to select the maximum entry-preventing offer, which is dependent on the
client's decision rule for switching auditors. Since clients are also
utility-maximizing, they will change auditors only when they believe that the
present value of a new auditor's fees plus the transactions cost, CS
,
is less
than the present value of the incumbent auditor's fees. The client's rule is
formally stated by DeAngelo [1981, p. 121] as
F < A + r(CS + K)/(l + r)
.
(2)
The right hand side of the inequality represents the maximum bound for
entry-preventing offers. That is, if a non- incumbent auditor wins an auction
after time t = 1 when the incumbent has offered a price within the realm
specified in equation 2, the non- incumbent would earn less than normal profits
over the remainder of the engagement. It follows that, in equilibrium, the
incumbent's future period offer is expected to be
F* = A + r(CS + K)/(l + r) - e (3)
where e is some arbitrarily small positive number and asterisks denote
equilibrium values. By inspection of equation 3, one can see that the amount
of future rents to be earned by an incumbent is an increasing function of the
client's transactions cost of switching auditors, CS , and the auditor's
initial period start-up cost, K.
When both CS and K equal zero, future fees will equal future period
avoidable costs in every time period implying an extension of the perfectly
competitive market at C = 1 to all future periods. The competition will drive
quasi- rents to zero in future periods and no advantages will accrue to the
incumbent. Using equation 1, it is evident that no lowballing will occur
because no quasi-rents are available to the incumbent. Conversely, as both CS
and K increase, the future quasi -rent stream available to an incumbent
increases, resulting in a prediction of larger amounts of lowballing in the
initial period
.
Before discussing the implications of DeAngelo's analysis for
independence, it is necessary to address her operationalization of the
concept. DeAngelo treats independence (operationalized as the probability
that an error is reported by the auditor, conditional on its discovery) as one
of two aspects of audit quality. The second aspect of audit quality, auditor
competence, is defined as the probability that the auditor discovers an error
in the financial statements of Che client. In reality, DeAngelo notes that
these two probabilities are not separable and independence or the lack of it
may have an effect on either or both of them. That is, an auditor who lacks
independence might succumb to management pressure by designing the audit so as
not to discover an error or by failing to report an error that has been
discovered. To simplify her analysis and eliminate any confounding of
independence and technical capabilities of the auditor, DeAngelo assumes that
the probability of discovering a breach by management is both positive and
fixed across auditors and time. Thus, only the auditor's report decision can
be affected by independence in the model.
In order for the auditor's opinion to have value, the market's assessment
of the conditional probability of reporting a breach in DeAngelo 's world must
be some number greater than zero. The greater the assessed conditional
probability, the greater will be the auditor's value in the market.
To the extent that quasi-rents accrue to an incumbent auditor, DeAngelo'
s
analysis predicts that auditor independence will decrease. The future quasi-
rents arising from the bilateral monopoly relationship provide management with
power to impose a cost on the auditor by terminating the auditor-client
relationship, providing economic incentives to the auditor to conceal
discovered breaches. These economic incentives are offset by both the
auditor's ability to impose costs on the client by termination (through the
cost of switching) and by a possible decrease in the market value of the
auditor's opinion and the resulting loss in audit fees from other clients
(i.e., collateral bond) if non-independent behavior is discovered by the
public
.
It follows that the greater the available quasi-rents, the greater the
incentive to the auditor to conceal management breaches. Likewise, under a
condition of no future quasi-rents, the auditor would have no economic
incentive to conceal a breach by management and would strictly prefer
disclosure or termination of the client relationship. Without quasi-rents,
bilateral monopoly, and their causes (i.e., the transactions cost of switching
auditors and initial period start-up costs) , the auditor is posited to be
perfectly independent.
Thus, DeAngelo predicts that variables present in the auditing market
will result in lowballing and in a decrease in auditor independence.
Lowballing itself is not predicted to affect auditor independence because any
loss incurred in an initial engagement is sunk, and accordingly, is irrelevant
to future behavior.
2.2 Operational izing the Model
2.2.1 Assumptions
DeAngelo 's model provided a theoretical link between auditor independence
and the intertemporal fee structure of audit services but was not sufficiently
developed for empirical testing in the laboratory. Accordingly, to
operationalize the model, additional assumptions were necessary.
First, to create a market in the laboratory, it was necessary to specify
an institution that defines the communication and exchange rules in the
economy [Smith, 1982]. In practice, no single institution dominates the audit
market. Clients, for example, may hire an auditor without consulting
competing auditors, and determine price and services (e.g., audit, tax and
management consulting) to be provided through negotiation. Alternatively, a
sealed offer auction may be used in which clients request that several
auditors provide written offers detailing the services to be performed and
price. The client then hires the auditor with the most attractive
price/service package. Likewise, some combination of negotiation and auction
procedure may be used. Consistent with DeAngelo 's characterization, which
abstracts from the multi-product environment in which auditing exists (see
Beck, Frecka and Solomon [1988a, 1988b] for an extension of DeAngelo's model
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to a multi -product setting) , it was assumed that only one product may be
offered by sellers. Since negotiations typically pertain to the provision of
multiple products and since some subset of hirings in audit engagements are
decided by sealed offer auctions, the assumption of a sealed offer auction was
deemed appropriate as a starting point.
Transactions costs arise from disclosure requirements and training of new
auditors by client personnel. Since the cost of disclosure and training may
be observable (although imperfectly) by auditors, it was assumed that sellers
have complete knowledge of the transactions costs incurred by the buyer when
switching sellers. In addition, full knowledge of transaction costs is
consistent with the common knowledge assumption in Table 1.
Third, it was assumed that the sellers know the outcome of each auction,
insofar as the winning offer and the winning seller. It is clear that the
identification of the winning seller is always known following an auction in
the audit market. At the very least, the winner will be identified through
the audit opinion issued with the client financial statements. The winning
offer is not always known by the market, but in instances where the sealed
offer auction mechanism is used, disclosure of the winning offer seems
relatively frequent (particularly with respect to audits of public entities).
Futhermore, as with the assumption of known transaction costs above, the
knowledge of the winning seller and contract price is consistent with the
common knowledge assumption.
Last, since it is impossible in a laboratory setting to operate a market
in perpetuity (due to a requirement for a number of different subject groups
and monetary constraints), it was assumed that a buyer exists for a finite
number of auction periods. This assumption raises the issue of end period
effects which are dealt with later in this section.
2.2.2 Market Characteristics
Auditor cost function . Consistent with the assumptions listed in Table
1, all sellers had identical cost functions. The cost function consisted of
three components. The first component, initial auction start-up cost, was
treated as a between- groups experimental variable. The second and third
components, which together made up constant future period avoidable costs,
were the reservation wage, or opportunity cost incurred when the auction was
won (operationalized by compensating subjects for losing each auction), and a
constant cost incurred by the winning seller in each auction. Start-up costs
were incurred only once by a winning seller in each market sequence, so that
all past winners in a market incurred only constant future period avoidable
costs upon winning an auction.
Client behavior and parameters . Smith [1987, p. 14] notes that the use
of incomplete markets (e.g., a computerized buyer) is justified as an
intermediate step in testing models of seller price behavior that assume
passive, simple, demand-maximizing behavior by buyers. Because DeAngelo's
characterization of buyer behavior satisfies the criteria set forth by Smith
and since seller behavior was of primary interest in the market, a
computerized buyer was used in the experiments. One limitation of this
approach is that the possibility of strategic behavior on behalf of a human
buyer is eliminated.
The computerized buyer followed the rule specified by DeAngelo, presented
in equation 2. That is, the buyer acted to minimize costs by choosing the
lowest offer in the initial period of an engagement and switched sellers when
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a new seller's expected future fees plus the transactions cost of changing
sellers was less than the incumbent seller's expected future fees. The cost
of switching was treated as an experimental variable and was manipulated
between- subjects over experimental sessions.
The discount rate and end period effects . The discount rate used in
equations 1 through 3, above, was set to zero in the laboratory market. The
extent to which auditors consider discount rates in their pricing decisions is
not of central importance to the insights provided by DeAngelo's model and
therefore was not considered here. However, the necessary assumption of a
finite time horizon (each client existed for five auctions) can be construed
as an operationalization of the discount rate, to the extent that the present
value of future expected quasi-rents is made finite.
The presence of an end period does not materially alter the fundamental
predictions made by DeAngelo. Specifically, to the extent that a future
quasi-rent stream accrues to the incumbent, there exists an economic incentive
for the seller to lowball and not to report a discovered error and hence fail
to be perfectly independent. Both the buyer and the sellers know the lifespan
of the market.
2.2.3 The Audit Process
To test propositions relating to seller independence in auditing, it was
necessary to create a process in the laboratory analogous to the audit opinion
formulation process. The essence of this process is judgment in the face of
uncertain outcomes and payoffs. The auditor's judgment concerns the choice of
a report to issue, given his posterior belief (after gathering evidence) of
the probability of material misstatement in the client's financial statements.
Due to cost constraints on evidence gathering, the preset of misstatements
11
is often uncertain. Thus, the "working definition" of auditor independence
used by DeAngelo (i.e., the conditional probability that the auditor reports
an error given that an error has been discovered) represents a simplification
in that it does not take into account the uncertainty that often surrounds the
existence of errors in financial statements.
When the existence of an error is uncertain, the auditor's choice of
reports is based both on the materiality level chosen and the level of risk
that the auditor is willing to accept. Materiality and acceptable risk are,
in turn, determined by auditor judgment. Thus, the effects of decreased
independence on audit judgment may be manifested either in the definition of
materiality chosen by the auditor or in the level of acceptable risk selected.
Given the large body of research in auditing dealing with audit risk and risk
models, and since DeAngelo 's operationalization of audit quality deals more
directly with audit risk than with materiality, a simplified model was adopted
where materiality considerations are absent (or set exogenously in the
definition of "error"). In this abstraction of the audit task, choice of
audit report is primarily determined by the maximum level of risk that the
auditor is willing to accept. Then, a change acceptable level of risk chosen
by an auditor in the face of a change in possible lost future quasi-rents
(through client termination) would be suggestive of a decrease in auditor
independence
.
The operationalization of the audit process required the seller to choose
a decision rule, used by the computer to select a report on the presence or
absence of error in information produced by the buyer. Consistent with the
description of the audit process, above, the decision rule was the maximum
acceptable probability of error in the buyer information at which the seller
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would be willing to issue a "no error" report, given the possible outcomes and
payoffs that he faced. Once the decision rule was specified by the seller,
the computer performed an examination of the buyer's information. The outcome
of the examination was an "actual probability of error," p E (which was
constant, consistent with DeAngelo's assumptions). Following the examination,
the computer issued a report ("no error" or "error") on the buyer's
information consistent with the decision rule specified by the seller. If the
actual probability of error was greater than the probability specified by the
seller, an "error" report was issued by the computer. Conversely, if the
actual probability of error was less than or equal to the probability
specified by the seller, the computer chose a "no error" report. The report
and the buyer's information were then provided to an imaginary third party
(the information user).
The winning seller faced four possible outcomes contingent on the choice
of report. The first two outcomes, which obtained if a "no error" report was
issued, were discovery or non-discovery of an error by the information user .
The third outcome, which could obtain when the seller chose an "error" report,
was the termination of the engagement (loss of incumbency by the seller).
This outcome occurred with a probability p t , constant across sellers and time
when an error report was selected. A fourth outcome could arise when an
"error" report was issued: the seller was not terminated and he was paid his
offer price. The outcomes and payoffs for a winning seller are displayed in
Figure 1.
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Insert Figure 1 About Here
The experiment attempts to capture the report contingent outcomes and
payoffs that face the auditor when issuing an opinion on client financial
statements. If the auditor chooses a clean opinion, he may face one of two
outcomes, either a significant error is later discovered by investors or no
error is subsequently discovered. Likewise, if the auditor issues an "error"
report (either a qualified or adverse opinion) , he may risk losing the
engagement due to client dissatisfaction with the report.
With regard to payoffs, the winning seller receives his offer price if he
chooses 1) a "no error" report and no error is subsequently discovered by the
information user or 2) an "error" report. Where the winning seller selects a
"no error" report and an error is subsequently discovered by the information
user, he is both paid his offer price and fined a fixed dollar amount, X.
This penalty is analogous to the financial penalties that auditors face when a
"clean" opinion is issued and significant errors are subsequently discovered
by users of the financial statements. When an "error" report is selected,
there is some probability that the client will terminate the relationship
(i.e., not rehire the seller in the subsequent auction, regardless of his
offer price). This outcome, analogous to the potential cost imposed by
clients when the auditor does not provide desired disclosure concessions,
represents a real economic loss in that the seller loses his incumbency and
the associated future quasi-rents.
2.3 Hypotheses
DeAngelo's model makes predictions concerning an initial offers for an
engagement and future period fees charged by an incumbent. Equation 1
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suggests that sellers' initial period offers will approach the initial period
cost less the value of the future quasi-rents accruing to an incumbent. As
presented by DeAngelo, the value of the future quasi-rent stream is determined
by future fees set at a maximum entry-preventing level. This rationale is
captured by Hypothesis 1:
H
x
: The equilibrium initial audit fee, F
x
*
, will be F
x
* = (A + K) - Z?
=1 (F*
- A) where n is the number of periods in the market and F* is the maximum
entry-preventing offer by the incumbent in period i.
Equation 3 predicts that the equilibrium value for future period fees
charged by incumbent auditors will approach the maximum entry-preventing
offer. The maximum entry-preventing offer depends on the future period
avoidable cost of the auditor, the buyer's cost of switching auditors, CS
,
and
the start-up costs incurred by the auditor, K. This prediction gives rise to
Hypothesis 2:
H2 : When CS and K are positive, the incumbent seller's future period
equilibrium offer, F* , will approach the maximum entry-preventing offer
in the market.
Where there are no advantages accruing to the incumbent auditor in the
market (i.e., where CS=K=0)
,
DeAngelo's model suggests that the equilibrium
initial offer and the equilibrium future period offer will be driven to
avoidable cost, A. Thus, no lowballing is predicted to occur because no
future quasi-rent stream will be available to the winner of the initial period
auction. This condition suggests Hypothesis 3.
H 3 : When the cost of switching sellers, CS , and the additional costs in the
initial period, K, are set to zero, the equilibrium initial period fee,
F*
x
,
and the equilibrium future period fee, F* , will equal the sellers'
avoidable cost.
DeAngelo's analysis also suggests several hypotheses regarding seller
independence. First, in contrast with the view often adopted by policy makers
(i.e., that lowballing leads to reduced auditor independence), DeAngelo
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suggests that sunk costs incurred in the initial period in the form of losses
from lowball offers below initial period costs do not affect the reporting
behavior (independence) of auditors. This position gives rise to Hypothesis
4.
H 4 : There will be no difference between the independence of sellers in
markets where lowballing has occurred and in markets where lowballing is
restricted.
DeAngelo's model also predicts that, as the future quasi-rent stream available
to the auditor from a client increases, he will be influenced more easily by
the client with respect to his reporting decision and thus, less independent.
The quasi-rent stream is proposed by DeAngelo to be increased by an increase
in the level of start-up costs, K, and by an increase in the level of the
clients 's cost of switching auditors, CS' (see equation 2). Thus the
following two hypotheses are suggested:
H 5 : Sellers will be less independent in markets when start-up costs are
incurred.
H 6 : Sellers will be less independent in markets where the buyer incurs a cost
of switching when changing auditors.
Where both start-up costs and the cost of switching are equal to zero, it
is predicted that no quasi-rents will accrue to the incumbent auditor. In
this condition, DeAngelo predicts auditors will be perfectly independent,
implying that their report choice will not be influenced by possible
termination by the client. This prediction suggests the following hypothesis:
H 7 : In markets where start-up costs and the cost of switching sellers are
both equal to zero, the incumbent seller will be perfectly independent.
3. Method
3 . 1 Subjects
The subjects were 120 undergraduate and graduate business and economics
students at the University of Arizona. All but two had no prior experience
16
with auditing" and 26 percent had participated previously in other laboratory
Q
market experiments .
Student subjects were chosen as surrogate auditors for a number of
reasons. First, given the requirement for dominant rewards^ and the nature
of the appropriate auditor subject group (partners who make offers on
engagements and issue opinions) , the cost of laboratory markets using auditor
subjects was prohibitive. Second, the expected number of audit partners
available as subjects was insufficient for even one replication of the
experimental design. Third, student subjects in laboratory markets act with
only real economic incentives in mind (consistent with DeAngelo's
characterization of the auditor). The use of student subjects in lieu of
agents operating in the naturally occurring market is well supported in the
laboratory markets literature: so long as real people pursue real incentives
in a laboratory market, choice of subjects should not be critical [Plott,
1982] .
3.2 Experimental Design
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of five experimental cells,
displayed in Figure 2. Three independent variables were manipulated: (1) the
buyer's cost of switching sellers during the market week, (2) the sellers'
initial period start-up costs, and (3) the presence or absence of a minimum
price restriction on offers, equal to the seller's direct cost. The
experiment was run in two phases. The first phase, consisting of a series of
ten markets without the audit task described in the last section, was used to
test Hypotheses 1 through 3 related to pricing behavior. The second phase was
identical to the first phase, except that subjects were required to perform
the audit task, and their payments were conditioned on the resulting
17
report/outcome pairs. The second phase was used to test hypotheses 4 through
7 relating to independence.
Insert Figure 2 About Here.
There were four replications of each cell (A through E) for a total of 20
experimental sessions. Each replication had six subjects, all sellers, for a
total of 24 subjects in each cell and 120 subjects in all.
3.3 Dependent Variable Measures
Subject responses in the first phase of the experiment included the offer
prices at which they were willing to sell a service in each of five auctions
during a market. The winning contract (offer) price is used to test
equilibrium predictions.
In the second phase, subject responses in each auction included both
offer prices and the maximum acceptable probability of error at which they
would be willing to issue a "no error" report, given the payoff function. The
effect of quasi-rents on probability choice (used as a surrogate for
independence) was measured in two ways. First, since the theoretical level of
quasi-rents available to the initial auction winner varied across experimental
cells, the average initial auction probability choice for the auction one
winner was used as a measure. A larger mean auction one probability choice
(the less the likelihood of being fired) for a cell is indicative of a lower
level of independence in the cell. Second, to control for the possibility of
individual differences in probability choice, the mean difference between
probabilities elicited for each auction one winner at auction one (when
theoretical loss from termination is greatest, due to available future quasi-
rents) and at auction five (when the theoretical loss is zero) was used as a
18
measure. A larger difference in auction one and auction five probability
choices suggests a lower level of seller independence.
3.4 Parameter Values
A summary of the parameter values used in the operationalization of
DeAngelo's model are presented in Table 2. The values for each of the
parameters in the cost function, as well as the other market parameter values
were arrived at after studying results of pilot studies and after discussions
with individuals experienced in laboratory market research . The values were
set so that, based on pilot results, subjects would earn an average of $20 in
the experiment (ex post, the actual average subject payment was $19.40 and
1 9total cash payments for the experiments were $2,328) 1 . Given the parameter
values selected, Hypotheses 1 through 3 predict the equilibrium offers
presented in Table 3.
Insert Tables 2 and 3 About Here
3.5 Validity Checks
A post-experimental questionnaire was used to gather demographic data (as
a check for successful random assignment of subjects) and to administer
various questions to gather evidence that requirements for creation of a
market in the laboratory had been satisfied and that experimental
manipulations were successful.
Demographic questions included inquiries regarding past experience in
competitive bidding situations, prior audit experience (to ensure that
screening of subjects was successful), past experience with laboratory
markets, age, sex, educational background, etc. Additional questions were
included to ensure that a laboratory market had been successfully created.
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These questions addressed Smith's [1982] precepts of salience (recognition
that rewards are tied to behavior), dominance (belief on the subject's part
that the payment received is adequate to compensate for subjective transaction
costs), and privacy (no knowledge of other subjects' earnings). It was
assumed that all subjects in the markets satisfied the nonsatiation precept
(that subjects prefer more money to less). Other questions attempted to
determine the importance of possible termination by the client when selecting
the probability decision rule, the extent to which subjects believed the
random audit task outcomes were drawn from the described population, etc. A
final group of questions served as manipulation checks.
3.6 Experimental Procedures
The site of the experiment was a classroom containing six networked
personal computers. Upon arriving at the site, subjects were paid a three
dollar appearance fee. Subjects selected from introductory management
accounting classes (64 percent of the group) also were given full credit on a
quiz (two percent of their grade) as an additional incentive to attend. The
sessions were monitored by the researcher and an assistant to minimize
interaction between subjects. A separate room contained a seventh personal
computer which acted as the buyer in the markets.
Following an initial sealed bid auction sequence, used to measure risk
preferences, subjects read a set of computerized interactive instructions
describing the first experimental market, designed to test Hypotheses 1
through 3, regarding price behavior. The instructions described the cost
function faced by the subject, the operation of the market, the behavior and
cost function of the buyer and how profits and losses were computed in the
market
.
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After completing the instructions, subjects began the first market
sequence which consisted of a computerized sealed offer institution using the
market parameters described in Table 2, with no audit task and certain
payoffs. During each of ten, five-auction markets, offers were entered by the
subjects on the computer keyboard and displayed on the computer screen. Upon
receiving offers from all subjects, the buyer selected a winner, whose
identification number and offer was sent to all subjects in message form.
Ties were always settled in favor of the incumbent subject, or randomly if
there was no incumbent. After receipt of the message, the profit for each
subject was automatically computed and displayed on the viewing screen. The
winning subject's profit/loss was equal to his offer less cost for the auction
and all losers had daily profit equal to $1.25.
At the end of each five-auction market, cumulative profits were displayed
on each subject's personal computer. Then, a new market began in which
subjects offered to sell the commodity to a new buyer. Subjects knew that
several markets would be run, but were not told the actual number.
After completing phase 1 of the experiment, subjects were paid their
profits in cash and were given a 45 minute break for either lunch or dinner.
The meal was provided to the subjects by the experimenter, in the laboratory.
During the break, subjects were continuously monitored to ensure that the
experiment was not discussed. As a validity check, in the post-experimental
questionnaire, subjects unanimously reported that they were not aware of any
discussions regarding the experiment during the break.
After the break, subjects completed a second set of computerized
interactive instructions describing the reporting task that they would perform
in the second phase of the experiment. Upon completion of the reporting task
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instructions, subjects were permitted to ask questions to clarify any portion
of the instructions that they had difficulty in understanding. Next, subjects
practiced providing reports in a nonmarket setting for five simulated
auctions. Subjects then began phase 2, which consisted of eight, five-auction
weeks where the subjects offered to sell the reporting task as a service to a
different buyer each week. The second phase was identical to phase one, with
the addition of the audit task and uncertain payoffs described in Table 2.
Likewise, the independent variable values were identical to those used in the
first half of the experiment for each group of subjects. After having made
offers and received the outcome of each auction, the computer prompted
subjects to enter a cutoff probability, from which a report was determined. -*
Following selection of a probability, the outcome of the audit process
for each auction was determined by the computer based on a representative
sample of outcomes selected in advance of the experiment . The outcome and
resulting payoff were communicated to the winning seller by his computer and
his profits were appropriately updated to reflect the payoff. When the
winning seller was fired by the buyer or fined for "error" discovery (when a
"no error" report was issued), the outcome (that the incumbent was fired or
fined) was announced to all sellers in the form of a message on the computer.
4. Results
4.1 Validity Checks
The major demographic variables collected in the post-experimental
questionnaire were analyzed to ensure randomization of these characteristics
across subjects. There were no significant differences (p < .05) across
conditions, indicating random assignment of subjects to each cell. In
addition, results suggest that the experimental precepts required for creation
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of a market in the laboratory were satisfied. Mean responses for measures of
salience, dominance, and privacy were all above 5 on 7 -point Likert scales,
with standard errors of .10 to .11. In addition, the scales had relatively
high levels of reliability (Chronbach's alpha or correlation coefficients of
.72 to .93). Finally, results of two sets of manipulation checks indicate
that the experimental manipulations of start-up costs and cost of switching
were successful (p < .05).
Responses to additional questions administered to subjects at the end of
the experiment indicate that subjects 1) obtained no pertinent information
regarding the experiment prior to participation, 2) believed that the outcomes
observed in the audit task (being fired or fined) were randomly drawn from the
described populations, 3) understood both the operation of the markets and the
probability selection task, and 4) agreed that they were not coaxed or led to
a particular strategy by the experimenter or by the instructions.
4.2 Hypothesis Tests
The contract price data for the last five markets (with five auctions in
each market) in phase one are presented in Figures 4 through 8. Each figure
displays the observed contract prices in each cell, plotted over 25 cent
intervals. The numbers on the graphs represent the frequency of contract
prices observed in each interval. For example, in Figure 3, the number "21"
plotted at auction one represents 21 contracts observed in the interval $37.25
to $37.49. Theoretical predictions (generated from Hypotheses 1 through 3),
presented in Table 3, are displayed as horizontal lines in the figures.
Insert Figures 3 to 6 About Here
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Two descriptive measures of the predictive ability of price hypotheses
are presented in the figures. The first measure is the nearness of the
predicted price to the modal 75 cent interval of prices (i.e., the 75 cent
interval containing the largest frequency of observed contract prices)
,
represented by vertical lines to the right of the contract price frequencies.
The second measure is the nearness of predicted prices to the median contract
price, represented in the figures by circles plotted to the left of the
contract price frequencies. In addition to the median and modal 75 cent
interval, the mean and the results of t- tests are reported in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Several caveats accompany the use of descriptive and parametric
statistics (e.g., t-statistics) in laboratory markets studies. The use of a
modal interval and a median admittedly lacks objectivity and is somewhat
arbitrary. However, there exist equal limitations in the application of
conventional statistical analysis to the data. Specifically, much of the data
fails to satisfy distributional assumptions and the requirement for
independence of observations. Given these limitations, both qualitative
evaluation (e.g., descriptive statistics) and conventional statistical
analysis are presented so that the reader may draw his own conclusions
regarding the hypotheses, recognizing the trade-off between the two
approaches
.
Results and discussion of Hypotheses 1 through 3 . Hypothesis 1 predicts
that initial auction offers in phase one are a function of the expected future
quasi-rents available to the incumbent. Specifically, sellers are predicted
to lowball in an amount equal to the future rents available to the incumbent.
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The initial auction prices in cells B, C, and D (Figures 4 through 6) provide
strong support for Hypothesis 1. That is, the modal 75 cent interval of
contract prices either contained or was very near the predicted equilibrium
price. Likewise, median prices are also very near the predicted level. The
results of t- tests in Table 4 provide mixed support for the hypothesis. A
difference between the mean of observed contracts and the predicted value
cannot be rejected for cell B. However, there is a statistically significant
difference observed for cells C and D, reflecting the tendency of the contract
prices to be skewed in the direction above the predicted level.
The second hypothesis addresses seller pricing behavior in auctions two
through five. Specifically, it predicts that the future contract prices will
equal the theoretical maximum entry-preventing price. Figures 4 through 6
provide mixed results with respect to Hypothesis 2. For auctions two through
four (where no quasi-rents were available) in cells B and C (Figures 4 and 5),
the modal 75 cent interval again either contains or is very near the predicted
equilibrium level. Likewise, median prices are relatively near the predicted
levels. However, in cell D, for auctions two through four (where no quasi-
rents were available) , the modal intervals and medians are higher than the
predicted prices and seem to move progressively farther from predicted levels
as the final auction approaches. This tendency is also reflected to a limited
extent in auction four of cell B as can be observed in Figure 5. Table 4 also
presents mixed results with respect to Hypothesis 2. The trend toward higher
mean contract prices can be observed in cells B and D, reaching statistical
significance in auction 4 in both cells. In contract, cell C shows a
significant tendency for observed mean contracts prices to fall below
predicted levels.
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In contrast, in auctions where quasi-rents are available (auction five
for cells B, C and D) , the medians and observed 75 cent modal intervals are
less than the predicted equilibrium in every case. Likewise, mean observed
contract prices are observed to be significantly less than the predicted level
in all three cells at p < .01.
One explanation for the tendency of offers to be substantially less than
the predicted level in auctions where quasi-rents are theoretically available
relates to occasional non-maximizing strategies adopted by incumbents and non-
incumbents. That is, non- incumbents were sometimes observed to undercut
incumbent prices and/or incumbents were observed to overprice in auctions
where quasi-rents were available. Given the deviations
from maximizing behavior on behalf of both incumbents and non- incumbents
,
subjects were apparently unable to infer (from price data) where the boundary
for entry-preventing offers occurred. The resulting uncertainty, combined
with observed risk aversion on behalf of all subjects in sealed bid
auctions 1
,
would suggest that incumbents would behave conservatively,
selecting offers well below theoretical maximum levels. These results are
consistent with other studies involving sealed bid and offer auctions (e.g.,
see Cox, Smith and Walker [1985] and Fisher [1988]).
The above analysis has further implications for initial auction offers.
That is, since the future rents earned by winners of the initial auction were
generally less than the predicted maximum, it is expected that initial auction
offers would be somewhat higher than that predicted by Hypothesis 1. This
tendency was observed in cells C and D. Likewise, in cell B, the distribution
of auction one offers tends to be skewed in the direction above the predicted
price
.
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It is apparent from these results that the conclusions derived from
DeAngelo's model are not very robust with respect to small deviations from
rationality. It is difficult to believe, even in the audit market, that
agents literally maximize all the time. As noted by Akerlof and Yellen
[1985] :
People may suffer from inertia. They may also rely on rules of
thumb which produce acceptable results on the average. So most
economic theory based on strict maximization is useful when
accompanied with the folk theorem that the results of this theory
are approximately correct if the deviations from optimality are
small
.
Thus, where slight deviations from rational behavior produces outcomes
significantly different from theoretical predictions, the assumption of strict
maximization is unjustified. Such a result points to the need for theory
revision.
The last hypothesis related to seller pricing behavior under conditions
of certain payoffs predicts that, where no advantages accrue to the incumbent,
a competitive equilibrium will be achieved with offers approaching the
sellers' avoidable cost of providing the service. The frequency plot of
contract prices in cell A (Figure 3) provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.
All but five observed contracts occurred within the 25 cent interval in which
sellers' avoidable cost was located. In addition Table 4 provides support for
the hypothesis. With the exception of auction 3, the null hypothesis of no
difference cannot be rejected in any auction in cell A. The significant
result in auction 3 arises from the presence of a very small standard error
(the mean observed contract price, $37.24, is only one cent away from the
predicted price of $37.25).
Descriptive statistics for Hypotheses 4 to 7 . The means, standard
deviations, and standard errors for the initial auction probability choices
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made by winning sellers in auction one are displayed on the left half of Table
5. The initial auction probability is presented both for all phase two
markets and for the last four market sequences in phase two (in an attempt to
control for learning effects) . It is apparent from the mean values that the
probabilities selected in cell A (where CS=K=0) is less than the probabilities
selected in the other four cells (where some cost advantage accrues to the
incumbent) . The smaller probability in cell A suggests that sellers tend to
be more independent (i.e., less willing to accept a chance of improperly
issuing a clean opinion)
.
Descriptive statistics for the probability difference for each market
sequence (defined as the initial auction winner's probability choice minus his
final probability choice) are displayed on the right hand side of Table 4, for
all phase two markets and the last four market sequences in phase two. A
smaller the difference between the initial and final probability choice
suggests that sellers are more independent. For example, using probability
differences subjects behave as if they were more independent in cell A than in
other cells because the probability difference is substantially smaller.
Insert Table 5 About Here
Results and discussion for Hypothesis 4 . In DeAngelo's characterization
of the auditor-client contractual relationship, it is assumed that sunk costs
do not play a role in auditor behavior. This assumption is key to her
predictions regarding auditor behavior in the light of recent policy issues
addressed by governmental bodies such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (e.g., the prediction that any attempts to restrict lowballing in
the marketplace will have no effect on auditor independence)
.
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To test Hypothesis 4, four one- tailed t- tests for the difference between
means for initial auction probabilities and for probability differences in
cells D (where lowballing is allowed and CS=K=A) and E (where lowballing was
restricted and CS=K=A) were run. In addition, to avoid the distributional
assumptions of traditional t- tests, approximate randomization analogs of the
tests [Noreen, 1986] were also computed. Assuming that the future rents
available in the two cells are equal, lack of a significant difference between
the two cells would provide support for the hypothesis. The results of the
statistical tests for auction 1 probabilities for all of phase two and for the
last half of phase two are presented in Table 6. The results of cell mean
comparisons for probability differences are presented in Table 7, also for
both the entirety of phase two and for the last half of phase two.
Insert Tables 6 and 7 About Here
None of the mean differences for cells D and E are significantly
different from zero. The p-values range from .30 to .44. Thus, it cannot be
concluded that the independence of sellers is affected by restrictions against
lowballing. Hence, in accord with DeAngelo's prediction, sunk costs appear
irrelevant. However, for this explanation to hold given the results reported,
subjects' expectations regarding the availability of future rents must be
presumed equivalent between the two cells, despite the large actual
differences observed (a mean of $1.25 in cell D versus a mean of $19.59 in
cell E)
.
Some support for equivalent expectations regarding quasi-rents is
provided by evidence gathered in the post-experimental questionnaire.
Subjects were required to respond to the following statement: "By gaining an
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incumbency (i.e., winning before the last day in a market week) during the
second half of the experiment, I increased my chance of making profit."
Responses were scored on a 7 -point Likert scale with a "1" as "strongly
disagree" and a "7" as "strongly agree." The mean (standard error) for cells
D and E were 5.1 (.30) and 5.8 (.40) respectively, supporting the contention
that subjects' expectations of quasi-rents were equivalent in the two groups.
Results and discussion of Hypotheses 5 and 6 . Hypotheses 5 and 6 deal
individually with the effect of start-up costs and the cost of switching on
seller independence. DeAngelo's model predicts that the existence of start-up
costs incurred by the seller and a cost of switching incurred by the buyer
when changing sellers give rise to an expectation of a future rent stream
accruing to an incumbent seller. The expectation of this future rent stream
is then predicted to decrease seller independence. Thus, the greater the
start-up costs or cost of switching in a market, the less independent the
sellers will be
.
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6, a series of cell mean comparisons were made,
using traditional t- tests and approximate randomization methods. The results
of the tests, using auction 1 probabilities, are presented in Table 6. The
comparison of mean probability differences (auction one minus auction five)
are presented in Table 7. Both tables show results for all markets in phase
two and for the last four markets in phase two (to control for learning
effects)
.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 predict that seller independence should be greatest in
the cell where no advantages accrue to the incumbent (cell A) because cost of
switching and start-up costs are both equal to zero. Next, because the
markets in cells B and C have a positive start-up cost or cost of switching,
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respectively, the sellers in those markets should be less independent than
those in cell A. Likewise, since the future rents available to sellers in
cells B and C are theoretically equal, there should be no difference between
the independence of sellers in the two cells. Last, the sellers in cell D
should be the least independent, since the markets have a positive start-up
cost and a positive cost of switching and therefore, the largest level of
available future rents. Thus, Hypotheses 5 and 6 predict subjects'
independence in the experimental cells will be ranked as follows: A > B = C >
D.
The cell mean differences for auction one probability choices are in the
direction hypothesized (lower mean probabilities suggest greater independence
on behalf of sellers). However, only the mean difference between cell A
(where CS=K='0) and cell D (CS=K=4.) is weakly statistically significant.
Eliminating the first four markets (to control for learning effects) improves
the significance of the D-A comparison to p = .04 and produces a significant
difference in the mean auction one probability choice for cells A and B (p =
.037), still providing only weak support for the hypotheses. However,
substantially more support is provided by the probability difference measures
presented in Table 7. Specifically, for the market five to eight comparisons,
all differences are in the appropriate direction, and except for the mean
difference between cells C (CS=4 and K=0) and D, all differences are
significant. Lastly, in all four approaches, the comparison of cells where
either start-up cost or cost of switching is positive (cells B and C) is never
significantly different from zero, consistent with the ordering predicted by
theory.
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The conclusion regarding independence is further buttressed by the
results of two questions presented to subjects in the post-experimental
questionnaire. The first (second) question asked, when the subject was an
incumbent, "On the last (first) day of each week in the second half of the
experiment, how important was the possibility of termination by the client in
your choice of probability?" Subjects responded to the questions on a 7 -point
Likert scale anchored with "very important" (scored as a 1) and "not important
at all" (scored as a 7). Across all cells, mean subject responses for the
first question varied between 5.7 and 6.6, indicating that subjects generally
regarded termination as unimportant when selecting their probability decision
rules in the final auction of a market. This result is consistent with
theory, in that no quasi-rents are available during the last auction. For the
initial auction probability choices, subject responses varied across cells; a
mean response of 5.0 for cell A, 3.0 for cell B, 2.8 for cell C, 2.7 for cell
D and 1.5 for cell E. This ordering suggests that subjects were least
concerned with termination in the initial period in cell A (where theoretical
future quasi-rents are zero) and became increasingly concerned as quasi-rents
increased (in cells B, C. and n,)
Results and discussion for Hypothesis 7 . Hypothesis 7 predicts that,
lacking economic incentives (e.g., future quasi-rents) resulting from
advantages accruing to the incumbent (e.g., start-up costs and cost of
switching), sellers will be perfectly independent. To test this hypothesis,
probability choices of initial auction winners for auction one and five are
compared in cell A. Since there is no start-up cost or cost of switching in
cell A, no quasi-rents are predicted to arise and, according to the
hypothesis, sellers should be perfectly independent in the initial auction.
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The auction five probability choice is used as a baseline (perfect
independence) since the incumbent will lose the engagement no matter what
opinion is issued (the client expires) and therefore has an incentive to be
perfectly independent. If the auction one probability choices are not
significantly different than the auction five probability choices in cell A,
then Hypothesis 7 is supported.
The statistical tests consisted of a conventional one-tailed t-test for
difference between means and an approximate randomization equivalent. The
resulting t-statistic for all markets is 2.917 (p < .007). For the last four
markets in each experimental session, the resulting t-statistic is 1.769 (p <
.097). Using approximate randomization tests for difference between means
with 25,000 randomizations, the resulting p- value for the mean difference of
auction one and auction five probability choices is .008. For the last four
markets in each experimental session, the p-value is .093. Since the results
point to less independence on behalf of sellers in the initial auction (the
difference in probability choices was positive at a statistically significant
level), Hypothesis 7 is rejected.
One possible explanation for the observed behavior might arise from the
tie rule that was used in the market. That is, even in cell A, any ties in an
auction were always resolved in favor of the incumbent. Thus, since the
competitive equilibrium was achieved in cell A, the incumbent could
successfully prevent entry by other sellers and retain the incumbency by
offering the equilibrium price. While there was no monetary incentive for
retaining the incumbency, sellers might still be less independent in initial
auctions if there was some utility for winning auctions (and retaining the
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incumbency) . Hypothesis 7 might have been better tested with a tie rule that
randomly decides the winning seller.
5. Conclusion
This study is an initial attempt to directly test predictions generated
by DeAngelo's model of the auditor-client relationship in a laboratory market
(see also Schatzberg's [1987] laboratory market study of lowballing which was
performed contemporaneously with the study reported here) . As predicted by
DeAngelo, lowballing was observed in all markets where it was permitted and
was observed to increase as the availability of future quasi -rents increased.
However, exact predictions regarding initial auction price were only weakly
supported. In addition, experimental evidence regarding entry-preventing
pricing by incumbents (Hypothesis 2) suggests that the theoretical predictions
are sensitive to small deviations from strict maximizing behavior on behalf of
subj ects
.
Experimental results were also mixed with respect to predictions of
market effects on independence. In accord with theoretical predictions,
subjects accepted significantly larger risks of misstatement (implying
decreased independence) with increased availability of future quasi-rents.
However, contrary to predictions, in a market without quasi-rents, the
evidence suggests that independence is less than perfect, possibly because of
the presence of a tie-rule which always settled in favor of the incumbent
seller.
In future research, tests of DeAngelo's model with other
operationalizations (e.g., see Duke's [1987] research in progress which
examines DeAngelo's predictions in a negotiated price market) to determine the
model's robustness are appropriate. Additional research might include an
34
extension of the theory to include uncertain costs for non- incumbents and a
focus on the demand side of the market for audit services (e.g., the
introduction of human buyers). Evidence from the study reported above and
from additional studies can contribute to the creation of better theories
regarding the relationship between variables in the audit market and auditor
independence and audit quality.
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Notes
1. Isaac [1983] describes how operationalizatiorts of logically consistent
theories or models can lead to poor predictions of behavior. Likewise, while
arguing for the necessity of empirical tests of theories of human behavior
Kaplan [1964, p. 35] notes: "An inner coherence, even strict self -consistency
,
may mark a delusional system as well as a scientific one."
2. Under the assumption that auditors are profit maximizing, they will
refuse an engagement unless they can earn at least a normal return, such that
the discounted value of the sum of future rents is greater than or equal to
zero for all future periods.
3. The term "lowballing" in this context refers to the decrease in initial
fees (below A + K) charged as a response to an increase in expected future
quasi-rents generated by increased start-up costs and/or increased
transactions costs of switching auditors.
4. The market assessed conditional probability of reporting a discovered
error is assumed to be some imperfect function of the actual conditional
probability that an auditor will report an error. The market's ability to
assess the probability is limited to its ability to observe a portion of
actual failures to report after a time lag, and to use other noisy signals
such as brand name of the auditor (reputation)
.
5. For purposes of the experiment, subjects who adopt the role of an auditor
will be termed "sellers." Likewise, the client is described as a "buyer."
6. To avoid additional and unnecessary complexity in the experimental task,
it is assumed that, when an error exists, it will be discovered with certainty
by the information user. Thus, the joint probability of error occurrence and
discovery by the information user is equal to the probability of occurrence.
While the assumption is not characteristic of the audit market, it has no
critical effect on the predictions of DeAngelo's model.
7. While not addressed in the experiment , in the audit market the cost of
switching incurred by the client may also work to make the auditor more
independent. That is, since it is more costly for clients to switch, the
auditor may be able to more easily convince them to "repair" any discovered
breach and therefore may be deemed more independent.
8. The two subjects' experience was limited to one auditing course. However,
in a post-experimental debriefing, it was clear that neither of the subjects
recognized the experiment as a representation of the audit market.
9. Prior empirical results in experimental economics suggest that the
presence of experienced subjects act to accelerate the move to an equilibrium
with no effect on the equilibrium reached [Ketcham, Smith and Williams, 1984].
The inclusion of experienced subjects (i.e., subjects who had participated in
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previous laboratory market experiments) in the subject pool was deemed
desirable because equilibrium behavior was the principal focus of the
hypotheses and would presumably be reached more quickly when experienced
subjects were used in the markets.
10. Smith [1982, p. 934] lists among the necessary conditions for creating a
market in the laboratory the precept of dominant rewards. That is, a
laboratory market must be constructed such that "(t)he reward structure
dominates any subjective costs (or values) associated with participation in
the activities of the experiment."
11. The penalty amount, X, of $10 was selected such that the approximate
expected value of choosing all "no error" reports during a market week was
approximately equal to the expected value of choosing all "error" reports
during a market week when the theoretical equilibrium is satisfied. The
actual penalty required for equal expected values was $9.91, which was rounded
up to $10 for ease of computation.
12. The actual dollar amount received by subjects in the laboratory market
was 10% of the dollar profit earned in the experiment, so that expected
average cash earnings per subject was approximately $20.
13. To encourage subjects to report the maximum acceptable probability of
error rather than a probability resulting in a specific report (greater or
less than the 15% actual chance of error fixed in the markets), a simulated
auction with randomly selected actual error probabilities was run for each
seller at the end of the experiment. The report choice in the simulated
auction was determined by the seller's probability choice in a randomly
selected market in which they were the incumbent. The actual error
probability was selected randomly from the interval [0,1]. The seller's
offer price and cost in the simulated market was equal to the price and cost
in the auction selected and the available payoffs were identical to those
earned by the subject in the actual market.
14. Prior research [Forsythe, 1986] suggests that subjects are more likely to
perceive a preselected sample as randomly selected from a population when it
is representative of the population described. That is, the proportion of
each outcome in the sample should be the same as the proportion of each
outcome in the population described to subjects.
15. Prior to beginning the experiment, subjects participated in a sealed bid
auction to gather data that was later used to estimate subject risk
preferences using the general constant relative risk aversion model of bidding
behavior [Cox, Smith and Walker, 1985]. Estimates of the Arrow-Pratt measure
of relative risk aversion indicate that all subjects in the experiment were
risk averse.
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Table 1: Relevant Assumptions in DeAngelo's Model
A. THE AUDIT MARKET
1. All auditors are known to have identical cost functions.
2. Contracting between auditors and clients is costly. The costs
include initial period start-up costs, K, incurred by the auditor
and transactions costs, CS , incurred by the client when changing
auditors
.
3. Future period costs for providing an audit service, A, are constant,
4. There exists a constant reservation wage available to all auditors
to be earned by auditing the next best client, and the reservation
wage is identical for all auditors.
5. The discount rate, r, is constant and identical for all auditors
and clients in the market.
6. The market is modeled with an infinite time horizon.
7. There is perfect competition among auditors in the initial period
of an engagement.
8. Auditors and clients are rational expected utility maximizers
.
9. All information is common knowledge.
B. THE AUDIT PROCESS
1. The auditor's probability of discovering a management breach is
positive and fixed and identical across auditors and time.
2. There exists an incentive in the market (i.e., collateral bond)
for the auditor to report a discovered breach.
3. There exists an incentive (in the form of an expected future
quasi-rent stream) in the market for the auditor not to report
a discovered breach.
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Table 2: Summary of Parameter Values Chosen for Operationaliza-
tion of DeAngelo's Model.
Parameter Value
A. THE SELLER COST FUNCTION
1. future period audit cost, A
2. reservation wage for auditing
the next best buyer
3. seller start-up costs (variable)
B. THE SELLER PAYOFF FUNCTION (for phase 2 only)
1. probability of error discovery, p E
2. penalty if "no error" report chosen
and error is discovered, X
3. probability of termination if "error"
report chosen, p t
C. BUYER PARAMETERS
1. buyer's cost of switching
sellers, CS (variable)
2. buyer's decision rule
a. initial auction
b. future auctions
D. MARKET PARAMETERS
1
.
time horizon
2 discount rate
3. market institution
4. allowable offer range (variable)
$36.00
$1.25
$4.00 or $0.00
15%
$10.00
30%
$4.00 or $0.00
accept lowest offer
retain incumbent unless
his offer + future fees
is CS greater than
lowest non- incumbent
offer + future fees
5 auctions
sealed offer auction
all offers allowed or
offers > direct cost of
audit
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Table 3: Price Predictions for the Operationalized Market (phase 1)
VARIABLE AUCTION
Cell CS K 12 3 4 5
A $0.00 $0.00 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25
B $0.00 $4.00 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25 $41.25
C $4.00 $0.00 $33.25 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25 $41.25
D $4.00 $4.00 $33.25 $37.25 $37.25 $37.25 $45.25
Table 4: Means of Contract Prices in Last Half of Phase 1 (and T-
Statistics for Hypothesized Prices)
AUCTION
Cell
$37.10 $37.25 $37.24 $36.73 $36.73
(1.83) (0.00) (5.00)** (1.04) (1.83)
$37.56 $37.28 $37.40 $37.68 $36.11
(1.68) (0.19) (0.91) (2.38)* (3.02)'
$33.67 $35.90 $36.36 $36.44 $38.35
(2.50)* (3.27)** (2.64)* (2.05) (7.51)**
$34.45 $37.34 $38.12 $38.63 $39.63
(4.33)** (0.23) (2.01) (3.32)** (11.81)'
* = p < .05 for 2-tailed test
** = p < .01 for 2-tailed test
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Independence Measures by Cell
Auction 1 Probability
Standard Standard
Cell Mean Deviation Error
Probability Difference
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Error
A. All phase 2 markets.
A .2894 .2741 .0485 .1444 .2800 .0495
B .3672 .2484 .0439 .2213 .1898 .0336
C .3597 .2941 .0520 .2391 .3342 .0591
D .3794 .2468 .0436 .3291 .3068 .0512
E .3931 .2571 .0454 .3291 .3068 .0542
D. Markets 5 to 8 in phase 2.
A .2331 .2779 .0695 .1063 .2106 .0601
D .4100 .2640 .0060 .2206 .2037 .0509
C .3669 .3262 .0816 .3038 .3774 .0913
D .3863 .2051 .0513 .3375 .2512 .0028
E .4313 .2777 .0694 .3638 .3333 .0833
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Table 6: Cell Mean Comparisons of Auction 1 Probabilities
Chosen by the Initial Auction Winner.
Approximate
Critical One-tailed Randomization 1
statistic i-statistic p-value p-value
A. All ph ase 2 mai kets.
D - A .0900 1.3800 .0888+ .0892+
D - B .0122 0.1972 .4225 .4239
D- C .0197 0.2903 .3808 .3849
C- A .0703 0.988G .1053 .1614
B- A .0778 1.1890 .1218 .1192
E- D .0137 0.217G .4146 .4113
C - B -.0075 0.1102 .45G5 .5499
B. Markets 5 to 8 in phase 2
D - A .1531 1.7735 .0430* .0157"
D - B -.0237 0.2835 .3894 .6108
D- C .0194 0.2013 .4209 .4191
C - A .1337 1.2483 .HOG .1126
B- A .1769 1.8457 .0373* .0375*
E- D .0450 0.5214 .3029 .3038
C- B -.0431 0.4107 .3421 .GG07
* = p < .05 + = p < .10
1with 25,000 shufUcs
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Table 7: Cell Mean Comparisons of Differences Between Auction 1
and Auction 5 Probabilities Chosen by the Initial Auction Winner
Critical One-tailed
statistic ^-statistic
Approximate
Randomization 1
p-value p-value
A. All phase 2 markets.
D - A .1728 2.3GG0 .0122* .0088**
D - B .0959 1.5139 .0701 + .0725 +
D - C .0781 0.9780 .1078 .1001
C - A .0947 1.2284 .1143 .1212
B - A .0709 1.2854 .1041 . 1 1 29
E- D .0119 0.1500 .4381 .4345
C - B .0178 0.2018 .3970 .3991
B. Mark<
i
its 5 to S! in phase 2
D - A .2312 2.0598 .0001* + .0059^
D - B .1109 1.4401 .0791 h .0780 f
D - C .0338 0.2974 .3851 .3817
C- A .1975 1.7002 .0430* .0112''
B - A .1144 1.4513 .07* 1 l .0798 f
E- D .0202 0.2521 .4013 .4045
C- B .0831 1.095G .1109 .2258
* = p < .05 + = p < .10
** = p < .01 'with 25,000 shuttles
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Probability
Chosen by
Seller, pn
("No Error" report)^
Pn > PE
1 - PE
Pn < PE
("Error" report)
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I
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Paid Otter
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Paid Otter Price
and
Fined $ X
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Figure 1:
Task.
The Seller's Decision Tree and Payoffs in the Laboratory Reporting
$0
Cost of
Switching
(CS)
Start- Up Costs (K)
$0 $4.00
A B
$4.00
C D E$4.00
No Restriction on Oilers Otter > Cost
Figure 2: Experimental Design.
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38.00
37.50
37.00
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Figure 3: Cell A (CS=K=0) , Contract Prices Under Certain Payoff
Conditions (Phase 1) -- Market 6 to Market 10.
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Figure 4: Cell B (CS-0 , K~4) , Contract Prices Under Certain
Payoff Conditions (Phase 1) -- Market 6 to Market 10.
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